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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
BRITTANY JEAN WARD
)
AKA SEAMON AKA TIMLICK
)
AKA WARD-TIMLICK,
)
WILLSON AKA WILSON AKA
)
MIKKELSEN AKA KAYLOR,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 46087
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-17-4971

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Brittany Jean Ward pleaded guilty to one count of felony
grand theft by deception. The district court imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with
four years fixed. Ms. Ward filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) motion for a reduction of
sentence, which the district court denied. On appeal, Ms. Ward asserts the district court abused
its discretion when it imposed her sentence, and when it denied her Rule 35 motion.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Ms. Ward issued two checks to a car dealership in Boise, in the amounts of $3,000 and
$4,500, for down payments on two different vehicles that she was buying from the dealership.
(See Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.4.) The checks were later returned unpaid, due to
an apparent lack of funds in the account on which the checks were drawn. (PSI, p.4.) The
dealership tried to get Ms. Ward to fix the problem, but with no success. (PSI, p.4.)
Later, a Boise Police Department officer found Ms. Ward at her workplace, and she
agreed to be interviewed at the police headquarters. (See PSI, p.4.) At that time, the officer
knew Ms. Ward had a felony warrant for her arrest out of Pierce County, Washington. (See PSI,
p.4.) Ms. Ward waived her Miranda rights and agreed to speak with another officer. (See PSI,
p.4.) During the interview, she acknowledged she bought the two vehicles and issued the two
checks for the down payments, but claimed the dealership was not actually out any funds,
because she had used a different vehicle owned by her daughter as a trade-in. (See PSI, p.4.)
However, the sales contracts provided by the dealership indicated the trade-in allowance was the
same amount owed for the payoff of that vehicle. (See PSI, p.5.)
Ms. Ward also stated she had been in “constant communication” with the finance
manager at the dealership about the down payment issue. (See PSI, p.5.) She reported the
finance manager had told her he would have his supervisor contact her about a resolution, but
she never heard from anyone further.

(See PSI, p.5.)

However, when reviewing the text

messages exchanged between Ms. Ward and the finance manager, the interviewing officer did
not see anything indicating an agreement had been made about paying the money owed for the
down payment issue. (See PSI, p.5.) The officer then confirmed the Pierce County warrant was
still valid and arrested Ms. Ward. (See PSI, p.5.)
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The State charged Ms. Ward by Information with two counts of grand theft by deception,
felony, I.C. §§ 18-2403(2)(a), 18-3407(1), and 18-2409, and two counts of issuing an insufficient
funds check, $250.00 or over, I.C. § 18-3106(b). (R., pp.30-32.) Ms. Ward entered not guilty
pleas to the charges. (R., p.36.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Ward subsequently agreed to plead guilty to one count
of grand theft by deception, and the State agreed to dismiss the other three counts. (See
R., pp.51-60.) The district court accepted Ms. Ward’s guilty plea. (R., p.51.)
At the sentencing hearing, Ms. Ward recommended the district court impose a unified
sentence of fourteen years, with two years fixed, and retain jurisdiction so she could go on a
“rider.” (Tr., p.48, Ls.14-22.) The State recommended the district court impose a unified
sentence of fourteen years, with four years fixed. (Tr., p.35, L.25 – p.36, L.4.) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with four years fixed. (R., pp.66-69.)
Ms. Ward filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction. (R., pp.77-79.) She also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence, requesting
leniency under Idaho Criminal Rule 35. (R., pp.82-83.) Ms. Ward later filed a supplement to
her Rule 35 motion. (Supplement to Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence,
Sept. 17, 2018.) The district court then denied Ms. Ward’s Rule 35 motion. (Order Denying
Rule 35 Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence, Oct. 2, 2018.)1

1

The Supplement to Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and Order Denying
Rule 35 Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence are the subjects of Ms. Ward’s Motion to
Augment, filed contemporaneously with this brief.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of fourteen
years, with four years fixed, upon Ms. Ward following her plea of guilty to grand theft by
deception?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Ward’s Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Fourteen
Years, With Four Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Ward Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Grand Theft
By Deception
Ms. Ward asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed her unified
sentence of fourteen years, with four years fixed. Specifically, the district court abused its
discretion when it imposed the fixed term of four years, because the fixed term is excessive
considering any view of the facts. The district court also abused its discretion when it ordered
into execution her sentence rather than retain jurisdiction, because there is insufficient
information in the record to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate. The district court should have followed Ms. Ward’s recommendation by imposing
a unified sentence of fourteen years, with two years fixed, and retaining jurisdiction so she could
go on a “rider.”
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving “due regard
to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ms. Ward does not assert that her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in
order to show an abuse of discretion, Ms. Ward must show that in light of the governing criteria,
the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing.

Id.

An appellate court, “[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence . . .

consider[s] the defendant’s entire sentence.” State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007). The
reviewing court will “presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s
probable term of confinement.” Id.
Retained jurisdiction is designed “to allow the trial court additional time to evaluate the
defendant’s rehabilitation potential and suitability for probation.” State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho
193, 194 (Ct. App. 1984). “Probation is the ultimate objective sought by a defendant who asks a
court to retain jurisdiction.” Id. (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567 (Ct. App. 1982)).
Whether to place a defendant on probation is a choice “committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court.” Id. Because probation is at issue, the standard of review for a district court decision
on whether to retain jurisdiction is the “clear abuse of discretion” standard, with a focus on the
criteria set forth in I.C. § 19-2521. Id. “Refusal to retain jurisdiction will not be deemed a ‘clear
abuse of discretion’ if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended
sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.” Id.
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Ms. Ward asserts the fixed term of her sentence is excessive considering any view of the
facts, and there is insufficient information in the record to determine that a suspended sentence
and probation would be inappropriate, because the district court did not adequately consider
mitigating factors.

Specifically, the district court did not adequately consider Ms. Ward’s

physical health. Ms. Ward wrote in the presentence investigation questionnaire form, “In 2011
my whole world changed as an accident left me in a coma and on life-support and the damage to
my brain I woke up fully deaf.” (PSI, p.10.) Ms. Ward’s Idaho Standard Mental Health
Assessment stated she “reports she was in a serious auto accident in 2011 resulting in passengers
in her car, her adoptive parents, being killed and [Ms. Ward] ending up in a coma with multiple
severe internal injuries and trauma. She is now hearing impaired due to the accident.” (PSI,
p.22.) A 2016 medical report stated Ms. Ward “was involved in a motor vehicle accident that
resulted in the death of her husband and children. She survived on life support[] for 150 days.
During the hospitalization the lack of oxygen resulted in hearing loss.” (R., p.48.)
At the sentencing hearing, Ms. Ward’s counsel clarified that Ms. Ward “was in a very
serious car accident with her significant other and people from her church, who she felt they
were her adoptive family.” (Tr., p.39, Ls.9-13.) According to counsel, Ms. Ward lost “her
hearing in one of her ears. Loses the hearing in most of the other ear. Has to learn sign
language. Eventually is able to go ahead [and] read lips.” (Tr., p.47, Ls.12-18.)
Ms. Ward also has a recent cancer diagnosis. While at the Ada County Jail, Ms. Ward
reported to medical staff that “she has bone marrow cancer in her spine.” (See PSI, pp.31-32.)
She stated she had been told she had cancer right before her incarceration in the Pierce County
Jail in Washington. (See PSI, p.33.) Ada County Jail medical staff contacted a doctor at the
Pierce County Jail, who stated Ms. Ward “does not have cancer,” but the doctor also reported,
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“She does have a dx of meylofibrosis [sic], but they checked her CBC at the jail and it was
normal.” (See PSI, p.33.) During the sentencing hearing, Ms. Ward’s counsel explained, “I had
no idea what Myelofibrosis was. I had to look that up and if you look it up, it says that it’s
cancer. The Mayo Clinic diagnoses it as cancer. And if you look further in the medical records,
she is being treated for that.” (Tr., p.41, Ls.16-23.)
Additionally, the district court did not adequately consider Ms. Ward’s mental health
issues. At the sentencing hearing, Ms. Ward told the district court: “My life forever changed in
2011 when I lost three very important people and where I almost died. Waking up from a coma
and realizing my life forever changed and also having to come to terms I would be deaf has
caused so much emotional trauma.” (Tr., p.51, Ls.18-22.)
In Ms. Ward’s Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment, she was diagnosed with
“major depressive disorder based on her reported history and current description of symptoms.
She reports feeling depressed or anxious and times when she struggles to perform daily tasks due
to her depressed mood.” (PSI, p.25.) The mental health assessment stated Ms. Ward “reports a
history of being abused as a young child, being placed in foster care and a traumatic event as an
adult which almost took her life. She indicated that she had experienced depression and anxiety
due to the lasting trauma of these events.” (PSI, p.25.) Ms. Ward reported her car accident “has
caused significant PTSD in her life.” (PSI, p.22.) The mental health assessment included “the
diagnosis of PTSD, per [Ms. Ward’s] reported history.” (PSI, p.25.)
Further, the district court did not give adequate consideration to Ms. Ward’s desire to
change her life for the better. Addressing the district court at the sentencing hearing, Ms. Ward’s
counsel stated: “What we are asking this court to do is give her an opportunity at a rider. Let her
show you that she can be a productive member of society.” (Tr., p.48, Ls.1-4.) Counsel
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explained that Ms. Ward “has never had treatment. In Washington there is no such thing as
going into prison and getting treatment.” (Tr., p.46, Ls.16-19.) Ms. Ward “has never had a
thinking errors class, has never taken moral recognition therapy, has never taken a cognitive self
change.” (Tr., p.46, Ls.21-23.) Ms. Ward’s counsel “had discussions with my client about these
classes. These are classes that she’s very interested in.” (Tr., p.46, Ls.23-25.)
Ms. Ward told the district court, “For so long I have not been able to figure out why I felt
so bad about myself, to feel I’ll never be accepted or have success in this life.” (Tr., p.52, Ls.13.) She was “tired of living my life looking over my shoulder waiting for the next bad thing to
happen.” (Tr., p.52, Ls.8-9.) Her counsel had helped her “realize that [to] keep putting me in
prison is not going to change my behavior because I’ve never been given the opportunity of
cognitive retraining or program employment training or any other type of training.” (Tr., p.52,
Ls.14-19.) Ms. Ward asserted, “the rider program would be a huge benefit at it would fully
concentrate on a training and reprogramming my life, to effectively identify the behaviors that
keep causing me to repeat the same pattern.” (Tr., p.52, Ls.19-23.) She asked the district court
to allow her “the opportunity to complete the rider program and come back before you and let
you see that I’m worth giving a chance to be productive in life outside of prison.” (Tr., p.52,
L.24 – p.53, L.3.)
Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating factors, the
fixed term of Ms. Ward’s sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts, and there is
insufficient information in the record to determine that a suspended sentence and probation
would be inappropriate. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed her unified
sentence of fourteen years, with four years fixed. The district court should have followed
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Ms. Ward’s recommendation by imposing a unified sentence of fourteen years, with two years
fixed, and retaining jurisdiction so she could go on a rider.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Ward’s Idaho Criminal Rule 35
Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence
Ms. Ward asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence, in view of new and additional information presented to the
district court. “A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251,
253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). “The denial of a motion for modification of a sentence
will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.” Id. “The criteria for
examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining
whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id. “If the sentence was not excessive when
pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction.” Id.
Ms. Ward asserts that her sentence is excessive in view of new and additional
information presented with the motion for reduction on her mental health.

For example,

Ms. Ward’s June 2014 Primary Encounter Report from the Washington State Department of
Corrections (WSDOC)2 stated that she reported her “worst symptoms are nightmares 4 nights per
week and flashback daily to loud noises and sirens,” all involving her car accident. (See Primary

2

In its order denying the Rule 35 motion, the district court stated the medical reports were “from
the IDOC.” (Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, p.3.)
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Encounter Report, June 18, 2014, p.1.)3 Ms. Ward stated that after waking up from the car
accident, “she heard voices of classical music and also, especially when waking up from
nightmares, stated she would hear a ‘demonic’ voice stating ‘breathe with me, breathe with me
you’re going to die, you’re dead’ and sometimes stating she was going to hell.” (Primary
Encounter Report, June 18, 2014, p.1.) The hallucinations went away after she went on several
medications, but returned about ten months before the date of the report.

(See Primary

Encounter Report, June 18, 2014, p.1.) Ms. Ward tied the hallucinations to her feeling stressed,
and also stated she would “feel the breathing on the back of her neck when she experiences these
things while waking up from nightmare[s].” (See Primary Encounter Report, June 18, 2014,
p.1.)
In a later Primary Encounter Report from November 2014, Ms. Ward did not “report any
hallucinations today, but states she is still anxious and often has nightmares.”

(Primary

Encounter Report, November 7, 2014, p.1.) A February 2015 Primary Encounter Report stated
that Ms. Ward had her medication switched for her diagnoses of PTSD, major depressive
disorder, and “psychosis NOS possibly related to traumatic brain injury and or PTSD/stress
mediated, r/o schizophreniform disorder.” (See Primary Encounter Report, Feb. 3, 2015, p.1.)
Further, a Brief Empirical Mental Health Assessment, prepared in August 2014,
diagnosed Ms. Ward with PTSD; major depressive disorder, moderate; generalized anxiety
disorder; and borderline personality disorder. (See Brief Empirical Mental Health Assessment,
August 18, 2014, pp.8-9.)

3

All of the reports discussed in this section are attached to Ms. Ward’s Supplement to
Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence.
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In light of the above new and additional information on her mental health, Ms. Ward
asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 35 motion for a reduction
of sentence.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Ms. Ward respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence
as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 5th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of November, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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